BiznesAlert EN https://biznesalert.com ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ENIVRONMENT Tue, 17 Jul 2018 09:00:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.7 Successful market screening for Poland-Ukraine pipeline capacity https://biznesalert.com/successful-market-screening-for-poland-ukraine-pipeline-capacity/ https://biznesalert.com/successful-market-screening-for-poland-ukraine-pipeline-capacity/#respond Tue, 17 Jul 2018 09:00:16 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2205 The non-binding market screening for capacities between Ukraine and Poland has been conducted by the Polish and Ukrainian natural gas Transmission System Operators, GAZ-SYSTEM and Ukrtransgaz. The procedure has enabled network users to declare their non-binding demand for the Capacity at the Poland-Ukraine border, in both directions of the flow. The results of the Procedure […]

Artykuł Successful market screening for Poland-Ukraine pipeline capacity pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
The non-binding market screening for capacities between Ukraine and Poland has been conducted by the Polish and Ukrainian natural gas Transmission System Operators, GAZ-SYSTEM and Ukrtransgaz. The procedure has enabled network users to declare their non-binding demand for the Capacity at the Poland-Ukraine border, in both directions of the flow. The results of the Procedure will be now analysed and taken into account by both TSOs in the future works concerning the expansion of the Capacities at the Poland-Ukraine border.

Between the 6th of April and 8th of June 2018 the market participants had an opportunity to express their non-binding interest in transmission capacities at the Poland-Ukraine border, in both directions of the flow.

Both TSOs have observed substantial interest from the market participants in transmission capacities in both directions. The following potential interest have been observed:

• approximately 3.9 bcm in PL -> UA direction
• approximately 1.6 bcm in UA -> PL direction, on a long-term basis, excluding the flows resulting from the existing transit contract.

On GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. side, any new capacity in the Ukrainian direction may be made available starting from 2022.

The above results of the non-binding market screening constitute very sound basis to conduct further joint analysis and studies on development of the infrastructure between transmission systems of Poland and Ukraine. The analysis shall also give the ground to the decision on potential binding capacity allocation procedure as the next step of the process.

Both TSOs shall inform the market participants about the further steps.

Source: Gaz-System

Artykuł Successful market screening for Poland-Ukraine pipeline capacity pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/successful-market-screening-for-poland-ukraine-pipeline-capacity/feed/ 0
US LNG that has not come up (yet) and terminals that are yet to come up https://biznesalert.com/us-lng-that-has-not-come-up-yet-and-terminals-that-are-yet-to-come-up/ https://biznesalert.com/us-lng-that-has-not-come-up-yet-and-terminals-that-are-yet-to-come-up/#respond Tue, 17 Jul 2018 08:00:36 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2209 Subsequent commentators refer to new LNG supply contracts from USA to Poland, which PGNiG was to sign. Only that there are no contracts yet – writes Wojciech Jakóbik, editor-in-chief of BiznesAlert.pl. Contracts that are not there (yet) In the Houston Chronicle, senator Anna Maria Anders argues that the agreement on the purchase of an American […]

Artykuł US LNG that has not come up (yet) and terminals that are yet to come up pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
Subsequent commentators refer to new LNG supply contracts from USA to Poland, which PGNiG was to sign. Only that there are no contracts yet – writes Wojciech Jakóbik, editor-in-chief of BiznesAlert.pl.

Contracts that are not there (yet)

In the Houston Chronicle, senator Anna Maria Anders argues that the agreement on the purchase of an American LNG signed by PGNiG last month is more than just a regular business transaction – informs the Polish Press Agency. – Anders, senator and minister at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister indicates that the contract signed last month during the World Gas Conference in Washington by the Polish company PGNiG with two American producers of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – Port Arthur LNG and Venture Global LNG – about deliveries, starting in 2022, a total of 4 million tonnes of LNG per year is an important step for the energy security of Poland and Europe and “for the flowering of Poland’s great friendship with the north-east coast of Texas”.

Meanwhile, PGNiG signed a memorandum with those entities on these agreements. This means that it begins the laborious process of negotiating conditions, including the price formula, which may lead to signing of final contracts. The Polish company’s communique on talks with Port Arthur LNG and Venture Global LNG is a clear declaration of the will to use further contracts to develop engagement on a global scale, as I wrote more in the text dedicated to these agreements.

– The signed agreement opens the way for entering a contract that will allow PGNiG to develop its LNG portfolio in the near future – said Piotr Woźniak, head of PGNiG SA, quoted in the communique on contracts with the Americans. Perhaps the message wrongly suggested signing contracts, not memorandums about the agreement. Sharper wording in such a message is worth considering in the future. At the first moment I let myself be fooled that the contracts had already been concluded.

Not everyone reads press releases to the end and probably the unauthorized comments about breakthrough agreements come from here. We’ll wait for that. The Copernican breakthrough has already occurred when PGNiG signed a contract with the British Centrica for the supply of LNG from the USA together with a price formula depending on the European stock exchange. That fact was shared by the minister of energy himself, Krzysztof Tchórzewski, and it means that the price of liquefied gas from Centrica offered by Berlin depends on the value on the TTF, which is competitive price for offers in Europe, for example, by Gazprom.

Competition is watching

This is important because the Russians are constantly convincing the public that American LNG can not pay off, and its import to Europe is a political matter. In the BiznesAlert.pl report on the NATO summit, you can read how this topic is played in accordance with German and Russian diplomacy in order to defend the contested Nord Stream 2 project. If we are too early to open champagne caps on new LNG contracts with the US, we are threatened with compromising and using our unauthorized opinions against us. It is worth to keep our fingers crossed for the negotiators of PGNiG, whose work in the US is not finished yet and wait for a message about breakthrough contracts.

Poles in American LNG terminals?

After all, not only them. I have already mentioned that talks on LNG deliveries from the USA on subsequent projects also cover the issue of shares in export terminals. Government Plenipotentiary for strategic energy infrastructure Piotr Naimski revealed that Poles can talk about shares in LNG terminals in the USA. If you look at the PGNiG competition, for example, which is already on the way to increasing LNG market share, this trend is visible. French Total bought financially involved in the disputed Nord Stream 2 LNG assets worth $ 1,5 billion from ENGIE. Among them were shares in the Cameron LNG terminal. Thanks to them, it will become the second player in the world with a portfolio of around 40 million tons per year by 2020. It is not said that LNG assets in the USA would have to be taken over by PGNiG. The first routes were cleared by the operator of the Polskie LNG terminal, which signed letters of intent with American counterparts.

Artykuł US LNG that has not come up (yet) and terminals that are yet to come up pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/us-lng-that-has-not-come-up-yet-and-terminals-that-are-yet-to-come-up/feed/ 0
Polish Briefing: Synchronization test in the Baltic states to be held in 2019 https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-synchronization-test-in-the-baltic-states-to-be-held-in-2019/ https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-synchronization-test-in-the-baltic-states-to-be-held-in-2019/#respond Tue, 17 Jul 2018 07:00:30 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2207 What goes on in Poland on the 17th of July. Synchronization of the Baltic states with Europe. A key test will be held in 2019 – In the next year, a test will be carried out to disconnect the Baltic countries from the energy system of Russia and Belarus – said the representative of Augstsprieguma […]

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Synchronization test in the Baltic states to be held in 2019 pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
What goes on in Poland on the 17th of July.

Synchronization of the Baltic states with Europe. A key test will be held in 2019

– In the next year, a test will be carried out to disconnect the Baltic countries from the energy system of Russia and Belarus – said the representative of Augstsprieguma tikls. At the time of the test disconnection, the electricity demand in the Baltic countries should be secured by local production and connection to the power grids of Sweden, Finland and Poland.

The chairman of the board of Augstsprieguma tikls (state-owned transmission system operator in Latvia), Varis Boxes, said that the value of electricity trade with Russia and Belarus is decreasing year by year, as the Baltic states should be connected with the zone in which they acquire the most power, ie with Scandinavia and Poland.

After the Baltic transmission system operators, Litgrid, Augstsprieguma tikls and Elering, have agreed on a specific scenario and test date, the conditions of this experiment will be agreed with other parties involved: electricity market participants, transmission system operators and electricity producers.

The shut-off time will be selected after the appropriate tests have been carried out and as advised by the experts. The European Union will co-finance the costs of synchronizing the electrical networks of the Baltic States with the European and tariffs for electricity transmission. The exact value of the operation is not yet known.

Ukraine will not raise fees for the transit of Russian gas?

During the three-party talks scheduled for 17 July, Naftogaz will not demand an increase in charges for the transit of Russian gas through the territory of Ukraine.

– We will not demand that, in the long-term, transit fees increase – said in a conversation with the radio Novoy Wremia, commercial director of the Ukrainian concern, Yury Vitrenko.

He reminded that the main topic of the talks planned for today will be the transit of Russian gas to European consumers after 2019. – After 2020, transit fees will be lower than those currently included in the contract – said Vitrenko.

At the beginning of July, Naftogaz filed a petition with the Stockholm arbitration tribunal, in which it demanded revision of tariffs from March 2013. Initial claims of the company amount to USD 11,58 billion (net of interest). At the same time, Naftogaz pointed out that the amount of claims may be reduced if Gazprom meets certain conditions – that is, it will reserve capacity for transit after 2019 or cease to block the transit of gas from Central Asia and export of gas by other Russian companies.

In addition, according to Vitrenko, Naftogaz is to propose to Gazprom that it apply EU law in relation to the transit of gas through Ukraine.

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Synchronization test in the Baltic states to be held in 2019 pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-synchronization-test-in-the-baltic-states-to-be-held-in-2019/feed/ 0
Polish Briefing: Ukraine wants synchronization with the EU and an energy hub with Poland https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-wants-synchronization-with-the-eu-and-an-energy-hub-with-poland/ https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-wants-synchronization-with-the-eu-and-an-energy-hub-with-poland/#respond Thu, 12 Jul 2018 07:00:30 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2203 What goes on in Poland on the 12th of July. Ukraine wants synchronization with the EU and an energy hub with Poland “You can not develop industry, create new jobs and build an economic system if you are accompanied by a persistent risk factor – the policy of a hybrid war on Russia’s side” – […]

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Ukraine wants synchronization with the EU and an energy hub with Poland pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
What goes on in Poland on the 12th of July.

Ukraine wants synchronization with the EU and an energy hub with Poland

“You can not develop industry, create new jobs and build an economic system if you are accompanied by a persistent risk factor – the policy of a hybrid war on Russia’s side” – noted the chairman of the Energy Committee of the Parliament of Ukraine Alexander Dabrowski. “Do not isolate Ukraine from the European energy market” – this is the appeal and message that was given by the delegation from Ukraine in the European Parliament at the meeting on the occasion of the Energy Day of Ukraine in Brussels.

On Tuesday, July 10 in the European Parliament, a report on the state of reforms in the energy sector of Ukraine was presented. The Chairman of the Energy Committee of the Parliament of Ukraine, Aleksander Dąbrowski, presented the state of implementation of the European Union law in the system of legal regulations of Ukraine. The Minister of Energy of Ukraine, Igor Nasalik, presented the strategic directions of energy sector reforms.

“The Ukrainian energy sector has the largest potential in Central Europe – it is 55,4 thousand MW of installed capacity. The largest European power plant is in Ukraine. Nearly 56 percent Ukraine’s energy production comes from the nuclear energy sector. Ukraine is also close to 31 bcm gas storage. Ukraine has been appealing since launching joint work on the establishment of an energy hub in Central Europe “- emphasized in the speech of the Minister of Energy of Ukraine. Aleksander Dąbrowski continued: “Ukraine’s energy sector plays a central role in the energy security of Central Europe and, based on cooperation with Poland and the Baltic States, we can build an energy hub that will oppose the dictate of the Russian energy monopoly.”

Ukraine’s plans in the energy sector

That is why Ukraine has been implementing a full synchronization program for 3 years. The first stage of the process is to be the Energy Bridge Ukraine – European Union project. “The essence of the project is that there is a 750 kV line between Poland and Ukraine. A cross-border line that has not been in business for 24 years. The exploitation of this line was halted when Poland synchronized its system with the European Union and Ukraine remained in the Russian system. The 750 kV line (Chmielnicka – Rzeszów) is an energy asset of value and strategic importance for the energy security of the Central Europe region. Today, the 750 kV energy line is a symbol of Ukraine’s isolation in access to the European Union’s energy market. Let’s change it and make this a symbol of energy cooperation, which Ukraine has been calling for for several years”- said Aleksander Dąbrowski. Minister Igor Nasalik announced that the tender for the implementation of the Energy Bridge Ukraine-European Union project based on public-private partnership will be announced this summer. “We invite investors to implement the project, the energy sector of Ukraine is an attractive investment area” – he stressed.

“Ukraine – as the first country experienced what the hybrid war means, including in the energy sector. This experience is a painful lesson for all members of the European community. An experience from which we should draw knowledge and formulate directions of European energy policy. Nord Stream 2 can not lead to the isolation of Ukraine and Poland. It is a project against the idea of ​​energy solidarity, which is the foundation of the European energy security policy “- summed up Michał Monia, Polish MEP.

The meeting in the European Parliament was attended by MEPs and representatives of the energy sector, experts and representatives of the European Commission and the European Association of System Operators for Energy Networks.

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Ukraine wants synchronization with the EU and an energy hub with Poland pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-wants-synchronization-with-the-eu-and-an-energy-hub-with-poland/feed/ 0
Energy in a news release from the NATO summit in Brussels. An allusion to Nord Stream 2? https://biznesalert.com/energy-in-a-news-release-from-the-nato-summit-in-brussels-an-allusion-to-nord-stream-2/ https://biznesalert.com/energy-in-a-news-release-from-the-nato-summit-in-brussels-an-allusion-to-nord-stream-2/#respond Thu, 12 Jul 2018 06:00:16 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2201 A news release from the North Atlantic Alliance summit in Brussels from 11-12 July included a record on energy security. One can also find allusion to Nord Stream 2. Point 78 of the NATO news release from Brussels refers to energy security. – It plays an important role for our joint security – states NATO. […]

Artykuł Energy in a news release from the NATO summit in Brussels. An allusion to Nord Stream 2? pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
A news release from the North Atlantic Alliance summit in Brussels from 11-12 July included a record on energy security. One can also find allusion to Nord Stream 2.

Point 78 of the NATO news release from Brussels refers to energy security. – It plays an important role for our joint security – states NATO. – Stable and reliable supply of raw materials, diversification of routes and suppliers, as well as connecting electricity networks are critically important and increase our resilience to political and economic pressure.

Poland, the United States and other critics consider the Nord Stream 2 project from Russia to Germany for the tool of such pressure. Germany considers it a purely economic enterprise. According to Warsaw and Washington, it will have negative political consequences.

– Although these matters are mainly the responsibility of national authorities, developments in the energy sector can have significant political and security implications for the Allies, also affecting our partners – said the NATO states. – As a consequence, we will continue regular consultations on issues related to energy security. We believe that this is crucial to ensure that the members of the Alliance will not be sensitive to political and hostile manipulation with the use of energy, which is a potential threat – we read in the communiqué.

– For this reason, the Allies will continue to strive to diversify the supply of energy resources according to their needs and conditions – the authors of the document conclude. Further on, NATO confirms the declarations of the communication adopted at the previous summit in Warsaw. They inform that they still want to defend critical infrastructure in the energy industry of the Member States and support them in this respect in accordance with the “established rules and guidelines”. They will also continue to cooperate with the International Energy Agency, the Renewable Energy Agency and the European Union.

Artykuł Energy in a news release from the NATO summit in Brussels. An allusion to Nord Stream 2? pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/energy-in-a-news-release-from-the-nato-summit-in-brussels-an-allusion-to-nord-stream-2/feed/ 0
PISM: How Russian Violations of the 1997 Founding Act Influence NATO-Russia Relations https://biznesalert.com/pism-how-russian-violations-of-the-1997-founding-act-influence-nato-russia-relations/ https://biznesalert.com/pism-how-russian-violations-of-the-1997-founding-act-influence-nato-russia-relations/#respond Wed, 11 Jul 2018 08:00:11 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2197 The NATO-Russia Founding Act adopted in 1997 reflected the consensus within the Alliance that new security architecture in Europe should be based on three pillars: enlargement of transformed NATO, European integration and partnership with Russia. Self-limitation on the stationing and deployment of troops in the territories of new NATO members was conditioned upon Russia’s observance of the […]

Artykuł PISM: How Russian Violations of the 1997 Founding Act Influence NATO-Russia Relations pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
The NATO-Russia Founding Act adopted in 1997 reflected the consensus within the Alliance that new security architecture in Europe should be based on three pillars: enlargement of transformed NATO, European integration and partnership with Russia. Self-limitation on the stationing and deployment of troops in the territories of new NATO members was conditioned upon Russia’s observance of the rule-based order. After the  annexation of Crimea, the Allies decided to respect the spirit of the Founding Act to limit the risk of escalation and defend the security system Russia is interested in derailing. The Allies, however, should adopt a less dogmatic approach to NRFA, which would offer additional flexibility in strengthening NATO’s cohesion and influencing Russian calculations – write Anna Maria Dyner, Artur Kacprzyk, Wojciech Lorenz and Marcin Terlikowski, analysts of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

The adoption in 1997 of the Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (NATO-Russia Founding Act, NRFA) was the result of the consensus in NATO in the 1990s on the future security order in Europe. The aim was to build a lasting peace, without rivalry among the major powers and without spheres of influence. Western countries committed to build a collective security system of which Russia would be part. NATO was to enlarge, but instead of focusing on deterrence and defence it should be better prepared to respond to threats outside its territory (“out of area,” or “out of business”). The European Union was also to use its potential to strengthen security outside its own territory more effectively, complementing NATO’s activities.

With the NRFA, the Alliance demonstrated that it did not treat Russia as a threat. NATO changed its command and force structure, but to survive it could not put any legal constraints on its ability to act in self-defence. Hence, the NRFA was political in nature and does not constitute a treaty from the perspective of international law. This was also the nature of NATO’s commitment not to station permanent additional “substantial combat forces,” which in practice was meant to constrain such deployments on the territories of its new members. Currently, Russia is concentrating on this part of the document, accusing NATO of breaking the NRFA. It is also a main argument in the discussion of the Allies against the more decisive strengthening of the Eastern Flank, replacing the formula of “continuous, rotational presence” agreed in Newport and Warsaw with permanently stationed Allied forces.

NATO and Russia have never formally reached a joint understanding of the term “substantial combat forces.” However, during negotiations on the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Allies indirectly agreed with Russian definitions presented in the years 1998-1999. At that time, Russia interpreted the size of such forces as no more than one brigade (usually up to 5,000 soldiers) in each of the new member countries. This Russian interpretation changed in 2008 and 2009, when Moscow proposed the definition of “substantial combat forces” as one brigade in total on the territory of all new NATO members.[1]The change in attitude coincided with the huge programme of military modernisation.

The conclusions of the NATO summits in Newport and Warsaw did not therefore constitute the departure of NATO countries from the content of the NRFA. The four multinational battle groups deployed in Poland and in the territories of the Baltic States have about 1,000 soldiers each. In total, therefore, it is still below the brigade level, and therefore consistent with the latest definition used by Russia. Such limits reflect concerns of some of the Allies that the withdrawal from the NRFA could open the way to the escalation of current tensions with Russia and lead to further erosion of the security system in Europe.

The additional deployment of a U.S. Armored Brigade Combat Team, with units rotating across Germany, Poland, the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria on a bilateral basis indicates that the U.S. is also attempting to avoid a departure from the political assurances given to Russia. Even taken together with NATO battlegroups, the level of personnel remains significantly below that of a brigade in each country.

Nevertheless, the possible change in scale and the formula of the presence of Allied forces from “continuous, rotational” to “fixed” would not mean that the Alliance would break the political commitment contained in the NRFA. The declaration on refraining from the permanent deployment of additional “substantial combat forces” was adopted in a completely different security environment. By using military power against its neighbours and changing borders by force, Russia caused a fundamental change in European security.

At the NATO summit in Brussels, a number of European Allies are likely to insist on respecting the NRFA. However, the attitude toward this political commitment cannot be dogmatic. It has to take into consideration not only the new security environment, which is the result of Russian aggression against Ukraine, but also Moscow’s obvious violations of the spirit and letter of the document in its political and a military dimensions.

Russia’s Political Violations of the Founding Act

The NRFA was intended to strengthen the post-Cold War rule-based European security order. In 1994, Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum, in which it gave security assurances against threats or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In 1994, it committed itself to withdraw troops from Transnistria, a separatist region of Moldova. Although it signalled in military doctrines that it was ready to use force in the defence of Russian minorities, and that it perceived NATO enlargement as a threat to its interests, investments in its military were modest and not threatening to the West.

Adopting the Founding Act in 1997, NATO members and Russia agreed to strengthen peace in the Euro-Atlantic area by respecting a number of principles. These were transparency in defence policy, size of forces and military doctrines, conflict prevention and the peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states, and respect for the principle of inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination. The Act also stresses that the parties will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

Through war with Georgia in 2008, recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, Russia broke all the above principles. Further blatant breaches could also be seen in the attempted murder of Milo Djukanovic, prime minister of Montenegro, and the chemical weapon poisoning of the former GRU agent Sergei Skripal on the territory of the United Kingdom.

Russia’s actions towards Georgia, Ukraine and Montenegro were also motivated (and openly defended in the first two cases) by the desire to stop them from joining NATO. This is contrary to the Act’s obligation to respect the right of states to choose means to ensure their own security, and therefore also their own alliances.

Russia has repeatedly issued open and veiled threats against NATO members. There have been threats against Poland and Romania to discourage them from the deployment on their territories of elements of the U.S. and NATO missile defence systems, and against Denmark and Norway, which considered a contribution to these systems.[2]

The verbal threats were supported with aggressive military actions such as flights by bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons near NATO’s borders. These flights included elements of attack simulation, as did Russia’s West 2009 and West 2017 exercises, the scenario of which included an attack on Poland and the Baltic States.

There is another dimension of the NRFA, which demonstrates how distant today’s security environment is from that of 1997. Russia assured NATO it would develop a democratic society, but its level of autocracy has only been rising since at least 2000. Russian legislation (including the adoption of the Act on Foreign Agents) restricting freedom of association and expression, along with repressive actions of the security apparatus towards the opposition, are the most visible examples.

Russia’s Military Violations of the Founding Act

In the military domain, Russian actions indicate a withdrawal from attempts to limit the role of military forces as a tool of intimidation. Russia does not comply with the obligation to prevent a threatening build-up of conventional forces and to exercise restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe. It started the transformation of its military into a force of permanent readiness and deployed offensive capabilities close to NATO’s border long before NATO decided to augment defences on the Eastern Flank in response to annexation of Crimea. Moscow significantly strengthened its military posture in Crimea and the Kaliningrad enclave, the latter bordering Lithuania and Poland, with the deployment of numerous anti-access systems (anti-access/area-denial, A2/AD), including surface-to-air missiles (S-400), coastal defence (“Bastion”) missiles and short-range ballistic missiles (“Iskander”). It also strengthened its air forces (including nuclear capable aircraft) and naval forces (armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, with an estimated range of up to 2,500 km). NATO’s decision to deploy troops to the Eastern Flank served as a pretext to justify additional moves, which have been in the pipeline at least since 2014. In 2016, Russia completed the formation of three new divisions in the west of the country (two in the Western Military District and one in the Southern Military District). Such violations of the NRFA gave Russia a strategic advantage in the entire Baltic Sea and Black Sea basins, where it can support hybrid warfare with a surprise offensive operation. With such tools it has the ability to exert significant political and military pressure on the Alliance.

According to the NRFA, Russia and NATO were not to consider each other as opponents. Even after the Russian war with Georgia, NATO, in its Strategic Concept approved at the 2010 Lisbon summit, referred to Russia as a strategic partner. Despite NATO’s self-imposed limitations and cooperation with Russia, Moscow has consistently repeated in its strategic documents since 1997 that it perceives NATO enlargement as a threat.[3]The military doctrine of 2014 (point 12) indicates that deployment of NATO’s military capabilities on the Eastern Flank is perceived as one of the most important military threats to Russia.

The NRFA also refers to a number of agreements, which at the time of its adoption were the foundation of the regime of arms control and disarmament. They were augmented by confidence and security-building measures in Europe, including military transparency in particular. These agreements are The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty (OST) and The Vienna Document (VD). These agreements are recognised by the NRFA as the foundations of maintaining peace and confidence in the OSCE area.

In 2007, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE, and in 2015 it withdrew from the work of a joint consultative group (Russia is represented by Belarus during the meetings). Although Russia formally remains a party to the treaty, it has in practice withdrawn by ceasing to provide data on the deployment of military forces and equipment and refusing to allow inspections that could verify such information.[4]In addition, the stationing of Russian troops in the territories of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine without the consent of these countries is an outright violation of the CFE.

Russia also violates the OST treaty. It has significantly reduced the possibility of Allied reconnaissance flights over the Kaliningrad enclave and the Russian border with Georgia. It has reduced the number of airports that can be used by states carrying out reconnaissance flights approved in accordance with the Treaty and terminated a bilateral technical agreement with the U.S. to facilitate such flights.

Russia also avoids fulfilling its obligations under the Vienna Document. Within the framework of the OSCE mechanisms, it should report in advance the planned exercises with the participation of more than 9,000 troops and should invite observers should the planned manoeuvres exceed 13,000 troops. Russia notoriously divides manoeuvres into smaller chunks, each remaining below the thresholds provided by the VD, while the whole series of coordinated exercises goes well beyond the approved limits. According to the Russian authorities, the West 2017 exercises involved 12,700 troops. However, the series of other manoeuvres connected with West 2017 increased the number of Russian and Belarusian forces up to between 60,000 and 70,000 troops.[5]

Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE and violations of the VD and OST indicate that Moscow does not conduct a transparent security policy and does not want to be restricted by any arms control regime. This is a violation of the obligations of the NRFA. The lack of military transparency has led to an increased number of military incidents and growing military tensions in the Euro-Atlantic area.

It can be assumed that Russia’s goal, contrary to the spirit of the NRFA, is to increase tension in relations with NATO and actively use military pressure on selected countries in the Russian neighbourhood, including Alliance members. After 2014, the number of unannounced exercises (“snap” exercises) increased significantly, including the placement of individual units and even entire military districts in a state of increased readiness. According to Russian data, about 30 unannounced exercises of various types and sizes were carried out in the Western Military District in 2017 alone.

Russian planes have repeatedly made provocative and dangerous manoeuvres in the vicinity of NATO aircraft and ships in international airspace and international waters in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.[6]Russian aircraft have been regularly employed to violate the airspace of NATO countries, especially Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, but also Romania. Russian planes, which fly with their identification devices (transponders) switched off, are responsible for a number of incidents that involved civilian passenger planes. Considered only at the technical level, such actions are a violation of the Act, in which the parties undertook to strengthen regional aviation safety. Finally, Russia is also accused of constant cyberattacks against closer and more distant NATO members.[7]

Possible Areas of Dialogue and Cooperation between NATO and Russia

During the Cold War, NATO learned that to maintain cohesion and limit the risk of conflict it was necessary to complement deterrence with dialogue. In 1997, the NRFA gave Russia a privileged mechanism for political dialogue, which was further strengthened in 2002. In the NATO-Russia Council, both sides could meet as partners at ambassadorial level (once a month), defence and foreign ministry level (twice a year) and occasionally head of state and government level (usually during the NATO summits.). The NRFA also opened the way for practical cooperation, which comprised, among other things, combating terrorism, missile defence, the security of Afghanistan, counter-narcotics operations, combating piracy, civil emergencies, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control, nuclear strategies, and scientific cooperation.

After the annexation of Crimea, NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia but kept channels of communications open, although it was difficult to agree the agenda of any formal meetings for some time. At the NATO summit in Warsaw in July, the Allies declared openness to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC. At the same time it stressed that return to “business as usual” would not be possible without clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions that would demonstrate compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

In 2016, NATO resumed “meaningful dialogue” at the ambassadorial level. The Alliance also maintains military channels of communication. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, met the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Petr Pavel in September 2017. The following April, there was a further meeting, with General Curtis Scaparrotti, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe. A special telephone line was also tested, allowing contact between the highest-ranking NATO and Russia commanders in crisis situations.

Since resuming, the agendas of the NRC meetings have included conflict in Ukraine, military transparency and lowering the risk of military incidents. This has involved the presentation of information on selected exercises and deployments of troops (including NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence and Russian military capabilities in the west of the country). The talks included aviation safety in the Baltic Sea region. In July 2017, the debate was extended to the situation in Afghanistan, and in May 2018 to asymmetric/hybrid activities and their role in security strategies and defence doctrines.

Dialogue on the most crucial aspects of mutual security hasn’t brought positive results so far. Russia does not seem interested in greater transparency, and violates arms control agreements, for example by presenting false information on the scale of exercises.[8]Despite talks about aviation safety, Russian aircraft continue to make dangerous manoeuvres in the vicinity of Allied air and naval units in Europe.[9]The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO openly indicated that de-escalation of tensions would not be possible without resuming the previous level of dialogue and cooperation.[10]This, in particular, would be used by Russia to prove that it is no longer isolated.

Russia has always treated talks in the NRC as a tool to influence the decision-making process in NATO.[11]The NATO-Russia Council provides the Kremlin with a useful tool for exploiting the differences between the Allies. Hence, it offers cooperation in certain areas, such as fight against terrorism or cybersecurity, in exchange for constraining and eventually withdrawing the U.S. and NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe. It expects that the Allies will not be ready to bear the costs of deteriorating security and will finally make such concessions, which will de facto or de jure grant Russia a sphere of influence on the territory of former Soviet republics and a buffer zone on the territory of NATO and EU border states.

Among the NATO and expert community, there are two different perspectives about how to approach dialogue with Russia in such circumstances. For some NATO members (mainly Germany, France and southern members of the Alliance), the fact that Russia is ready to go to the brink of confrontation is an argument that the scope of dialogue should be broadened, and that the Alliance should even consider returning to some forms of cooperation with Russia. This could maintain, the argument goes, the importance of the NRC, limiting the risk that Allies would strengthen bilateral contacts, which could undermine NATO’s cohesion.

Others (especially Poland and the Baltic States) emphasise that NATO-Russia Council meetings are used by Russia to exert political pressure on the Alliance, and that broadening the scope of dialogue would be a major concession towards Russia. This, together with a dogmatic approach to the NRFA, would send a strategic signal that NATO was succumbing under pressure. With proof of the benefits of its aggressive policy, Russia would have no interest in observing the agreed norms and may hope that further escalation of tension would break the Alliance.

Due to the specificity of the NRC as a channel of political contacts, there is no real possibility to deepen dialogue on arms control and prevention of incidents. This would require a return to practical expert cooperation and/or forums and organisations better adapted to work on detailed solutions. For example, a working group of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has been dealing with flight safety in the Baltic Sea region since 2015. Irregular or individual briefings on the deployment of troops on the NATO and Russian borders do not replace the wider and comprehensive system of notification and inspection of the CFE Treaty.

Russia wants to expand the discussion and exchange of information in the NRC about exercises. However, agreeing to this would mean reducing the significance of the Vienna Document. It would also undermine NATO’s efforts to modernise the VD in the OSCE forum. This modernisation may also cover issues of responding to military incidents. The strengthening of such a mechanism, which is already in Vienna Document (Art. 17), is promoted by Poland.

The OSCE, with its 57 members including Sweden, Finland and Ukraine, who are not members of NATO, is a much more appropriate forum for such discussions than the NRC. Sharp disputes between Ukraine and Russia at the OSCE are, however, cited by some of the Allies as one of the sources of the impasse in this organisation and the argument for the talks in other formats.

Coordination of the joint position of NATO countries in the NRC with their bilateral activities with Russia and other forums is becoming more and more challenging. An example of this was the proposal to conclude a new agreement with Russia on conventional arms control in Europe (replacing the CFE Treaty), presented in August 2016 by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, then minister of foreign affairs of Germany. In the end, it translated into the opening of  “structured dialogue” in the OSCE with a lower level of ambition (discussion on doctrines, trends in the armed forces and perception of threats). But it also led to the creation of  the group of “like-minded countries” outside the OSCE, which consists of 22 countries (excluding Russia, the U.S. and Poland). Since September 2016, the like-minded group has been discussing the future arms control regime.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The intention of the NRFA was to send a strategic signal that NATO does not treat Russia as a threat. At the same time, there was a consensus in the Alliance that it could not accept any limitations on its right and ability to act in self-defence. In practice, however, the NRFA has been treated by numerous countries as an excuse for cutting down on defence spending and necessary investments, which limited NATO’s ability to perform collective defence and crisis management missions at the same time.

A number of serious Russian violations of the NRFA gives the Alliance grounds to withdraw from its provisions, in particular from restrictions on the permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on its Eastern Flank. This commitment concerned the “current and predictable security environment” of 1997, which undoubtedly underwent a radical change due to Russia’s actions (rebus sic stantibusclause). Depending on the interpretation of the term “substantial combat forces”, it would be possible to increase the presence beyond the battalion-size (1,000 soldiers) multinational battle groups, while adhering to the main provisions of the Act. If the Russian definition from 1998 and 1999 were to be adopted, NATO could deploy additional forces if they did not exceed the threshold of one brigade in each of the new NATO members (about 5,000 soldiers).

NATO also has the right to a flexible, rather than dogmatic, interpretation of the term because of the negative trends in Russia’s military modernisation. The scale of acceptable strengthening of NATO’s presence within the NRFA pledge should be considered with reference to Russia’s increased military superiority in the region, which affects the interpretation of NATO’s “substantial combat forces”. By moving from rotational to fixed presence on the territories of new NATO members, the major powers would signal that the status of the region is not negotiable and the Alliance will not succumb to Russian pressure.

However, it is not so much the issue of formal interpretation that determines the direction of the Allied discussion, but rather the political premises. A number of NATO states do not perceive Russia as a key threat, especially when they have to deal with migration and terrorism.  NATO would also like to avoid further escalation of tensions with Russia. With inadequate defence spending and neglected investments, even major European powers do not possess the necessary resources to deal with threats in the south and the east at the same time.

The abandonment of the NRFA could also change the whole concept of the security order, from collective security and possible cooperation with Russia to a policy based mainly on deterrence. This, in turn, would mean an uncontrolled increase in the political, economic and military costs of maintaining peace in Europe. Avoiding such a scenario is the main goal of a number of NATO states, and the NRFA provides a useful mechanism for this. At the same time, many countries also believe that keeping the NRFA in force is an essential incentive for Russia to respect the rule-based order, but if Moscow decided to dismantle it further, NATO would have a stronger basis to act in self-defence by demonstrating “moral superiority”.

For these reasons, NATO and the U.S. should be prepared for compromise, which would allow the Alliance to  act in the spirit of the NRFA and make its presence on the Eastern Flank permanent. The U.S. Congress is already considering whether to change the presence of the Armored Brigade Combat Team from rotational to permanent. Such a deployment could still be within the spirit of the NRFA, while sending a signal to Russia that it will not achieve its goals by a policy of aggression and intimidation. It would also be a message that, should Moscow attempt to enforce a new security architecture, NATO border states will not be treated as a buffer zone

It is likely that a number of Allies will try to balance deterrence with deeper dialogue with Russia. In such a case, dialogue should comply with three principles:

1) Non-initiation of practical cooperation with Russia (“business as usual”), until it meets the conditions set out in the communiqué from the summit in Warsaw.

2) Not undermining the role of other European security institutions, in particular the OSCE.

3) Return to the practice of agreeing NATO’s position ahead of the NRC meeting, especially on the most divisive issues.

However, NATO also has to be prepared for the fact that the scope and substance of dialogue with Russia can be significantly influenced by results of consultations between U.S. President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. Hence, pressure for renewed cooperation cannot be excluded, especially in the fight against terrorism.

PISM


[1]See: W. Alberque, “‘Substantial Combat Forces’ in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations,” Research Paper 131, NATO Defense College, 7 July 2016, www.ndc.nato.int.

[3] Russian National Security Blueprint, 30 December 1997, www.fas.org.

[2]See, e.g.: A.E. Kramer, “Russian General Makes Threat on Missile-Defense Sites,” The New York Times, 3 May 2012, www.nytimes.com; D. Dyomkin, “Putin says Romania, Poland may now be in Russia’s cross-hairs,” Reuters, 27 May 2016, www.reuters.com; “Russia repeats warning against building a missile shield in Norway,” Norway Today, 9 March 2017, http://norwaytoday.info; “Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield,” Reuters, 22 March 2015, www.reuters.com.

[4]It is highly likely that Belarus also provides Russia with data acquired from NATO countries through exchanges and inspections. As a response to the 2007 suspension of Russian participation in the CFE, NATO countries ceased carrying out such obligations towards Russia.

[5]See, e.g.: D. Johnson, “ZAPAD 2017 and Euro-Atlantic security,” NATO Review, 14 December 2017, www.nato.int.

[6]See, e.g.: J.E. Barnes, G. Lubold, “Russian Warplanes Buzz U.S. Navy Destroyer, Polish Helicopter,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 April 2016, www.wsj.com.

[7]A. Mutler, “Romania Minister Says Country Facing Constant Cyber Attacks, Russians,” AP News, 25 June 2018, www.apnews.com.; E. MacAskill, “U.S. and UK Blame Russia for ‘Malicious’ Cyber-Offensive,” The Guardian, 16 April 2018, www.theguardian.co.uk.

[8]Press notice by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, 26 November 2017, www.nato.int.

[9]See, e.g.: H. Ellyatt, “US Navy releases video of a Russian fighter jet buzzing one of its planes,” CNBC, 31 January 2018, www.cnbc.com.

[10]Statement by Mr. Alexander Grushko, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO at  the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, 27 June 2017, www.osce.org.; Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation(approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), www.mud.ru.

[11]Vladimir Putin, Speech and Answers to Questions at Rice University, Houston, 14 November 2001, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ transcripts/21400.  

Artykuł PISM: How Russian Violations of the 1997 Founding Act Influence NATO-Russia Relations pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/pism-how-russian-violations-of-the-1997-founding-act-influence-nato-russia-relations/feed/ 0
Polish Briefing: Ukraine is a reliable partner in gas supplies to Europe https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-is-a-reliable-partner-in-gas-supplies-to-europe/ https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-is-a-reliable-partner-in-gas-supplies-to-europe/#respond Wed, 11 Jul 2018 07:00:43 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2199 What goes on in Poland on the 11th of July. EU: Ukraine is a reliable partner in gas supplies to Europe The next Ukraine – European Union summit takes place in Brussels. After meeting, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko with the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and the President of the European […]

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Ukraine is a reliable partner in gas supplies to Europe pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
What goes on in Poland on the 11th of July.

EU: Ukraine is a reliable partner in gas supplies to Europe

The next Ukraine – European Union summit takes place in Brussels. After meeting, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko with the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk stressed the need to continue political and economic reforms in Ukraine, including the gas sector.

Continuation of energy market reforms

As we read in the joint statement of the sides, the need for further reforms in the energy sector was agreed so that this process would eventually be terminated. It stresses the need to reform the gas and electricity market and to complete the necessary chapter on the integration of the Ukrainian energy market with the EU energy market. – We confirmed this commitment to prepare Ukraine’s integration with the European electricity market, based on the 2017 agreement between the respective transmission system operators.

“A reliable partner”

It was confirmed once again that Ukraine is a strategic gas transit state for affordable, safe and durable supplies to the EU. – In this context, we reaffirmed our readiness to engage in a tripartite process supported by the European Commission on a contractual framework for the transit of gas to the EU after 2019. Last week, the vice-president of the European Commission for energy union, Marosz Szefczovicz, announced that on 17 July there will be talks on gas transit between the European Union, Russia and Ukraine.

Artykuł Polish Briefing: Ukraine is a reliable partner in gas supplies to Europe pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-ukraine-is-a-reliable-partner-in-gas-supplies-to-europe/feed/ 0
Pulaski Foundation: Strategy for the energy crisis communication https://biznesalert.com/pulaski-foundation-strategy-for-the-energy-crisis-communication/ https://biznesalert.com/pulaski-foundation-strategy-for-the-energy-crisis-communication/#respond Tue, 10 Jul 2018 11:00:54 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2193 The roundtable meeting “Strategy for the energy crisis communication” was held on July 2, 2018 in the office of Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine. It was the third workshop in the project “Energy security and effective strategic communication the civil and governmental actors: V4+Ukraine” sponsored by International Visegrad Fund. The project constitutes cooperation between Visegrad and Ukrainian think […]

Artykuł Pulaski Foundation: Strategy for the energy crisis communication pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
The roundtable meeting “Strategy for the energy crisis communication” was held on July 2, 2018 in the office of Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine. It was the third workshop in the project “Energy security and effective strategic communication the civil and governmental actors: V4+Ukraine” sponsored by International Visegrad Fund.

The project constitutes cooperation between Visegrad and Ukrainian think tanks:

1.   Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Poland (www.pulaski.pl)
2.   Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia (www.sfpa.sk)
3.   KNO Czech, the Czech Republic (www.kno.cz)
4.   Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI, Ukraine (www.geostrategy.org.ua)
5.   Center for Fair Political Analysis, Hungary (www.meltanyossag.hu)

During the event experts from Casimir Pulaski Foundation presented a report “Making crisis simulation matter”. Also, participants of the project from Hungary and Ukraine introduced the structure of energy crisis communication in their countries, as well as the platform of energy crisis communication between experts and issues of information policy, were discussed on the meeting.

Dr. Sergiy Korsunsky, Ambassador, Director of Hennadii Udovenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine opened the conference. He noted that V4 countries and Ukraine share common interests in the field of security of natural gas supply and transit of Russian gas to European consumers. Therefore, it is important to develop strategic communication between above-mentioned states, to strengthen the trust between actors and improve coordination and planning of their energy policies, including in the field of crisis management.

Dr. Natalia Slobodian, the research leader of the project team, introduced the presentation about future simulation workshop, its goals, scenario and scheme. Arguing the importance of simulation games for strengthening the energy security she underlined “Let’s look at the military sector. They regularly have so-called command and staff exercises or games, where military threats and emergencies are modulated as well as the all potential scenarios how to solve or mitigate the problems are in the focus of these games. It’s worth to note that last time the energy issues are the part of many crisis simulations but I should stress that energy crises like a separate issue is very seldom in the focus. Nowadays the situation in the energy sector has dramatically changed, when one of the key energy suppliers declared that energy is a weapon, which will contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals. We don’t know when, where, or how big will be the energy crisis, but we should be ready to quickly react and to look for the best solutions for our countries and region as well. Actually, the simulation game is a perfect instrument for governments and decision-makers to test the situation, to modulate the crisis and finally to find the best solution. We should clearly understand that the goal of any simulation is not to win but it is a possibility to play the decision in certain circumstances”.

Michaela Karaskova, the President of KNO Czeska, emphasized that military sector regularly has so-called command and staff exercises or games, where military threats and emergencies are modulated as well as the all potential scenarios how to solve or mitigate the problems are in the focus of these games. It’s worth to note that last time the energy issues are the part of many crisis simulations but I should stress that energy crises like a separate issue are very seldom in the focus. As I mentioned here we don’t know when, where, or how big will be the energy crisis, but we should be ready to quickly react and to look for the best solutions for our countries and region as well. Actually, the simulation game is a perfect instrument for governments and decision-makers to test the situation, to modulate the crisis and finally to find the best solution.

Vitalii Martyniuk, expert from Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI, stressed the necessity to focus on the regional dimension at the simulation within the project and proposed to group participants into three groups: governmental representatives, business, non-governmental actors. In this way regional (V4+UA) energy crisis communication can be tested.

Dr. Alrxander Duleba, Director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association stressed that V4 – Ukraine cooperation in the field of energy should go beyond security of supply agenda and look for gradual creation of regional gas and electricity markets.  In institutional terms, it should go beyond governmental structures and involve regulatory authorities, key business actors (national TSOs, national distribution and retailer companies), and last but not least civil society and independent expert communities.  It should also include exchange of best practices when it comes to communication and cooperation between government – business – NGO actors on both national and regional level.

Hungarian expert Andras Jenei from Center for Fair Political Analysis added that the transit agreement between Ukraine and Russia has to be based on a trilateral agreement, being EU as a facilitator. Ukraine needs at least 40 Bcm transit volume to be able to secure the reverse flows from Hungary and Slovakia, as well to maintain the transit system. The ideal scenario is 60 bcm per year.

The participants agreed on that solidarity is not enough during an energy crisis, written agreements will be only able to fulfill the neighboring countries needs during a gas crisis.
Dr. Mykhailo Gonchar, President from Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI, stated that before developing the energy crisis communication models, it is necessary to understand what Gazprom can do according to directives from the Kremlin. It is likely that Russia can engage in active action, based not only on “gas issues”, but also on a wider range creating the chaotic situation in and around Ukraine. Therefore, the gas crisis may erupt not only January 1, 2020, after the expiration of the current transit contract, but earlier, during the election campaign in Ukraine at the end of winter and beginning of spring 2019.

Director of the Department on NATO and EU of MFA of Ukraine Serhii Saienko, Head of Energy Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies Oleksandr Sukhodolia and Deputy Director of the Department of Information Security and the Development of Information Society of the National Institute for Strategic Studies Anastasiia Barovska presented Ukrainian experience of the strategic communication in the Energy sphere, including that based on the results of the Table Top Exercises “COHERENT RESILIENCE 2017” on protection of the critical electricity infrastructure in Ukraine. Participants of the discussion noted importance of defining a key institution, which is responsible for coordination of energy crisis communication at the national level, and a key national coordinator to communicate at the international level, as well as structuring this communication into single and clear mechanism fixed by a legislative act.

The meeting was the second event of the project that will allow organizing comprehensive simulation of the energy crisis during that will take place during Warsaw Security Forum 2018 conference in October 2018.

Pulaski Foundation

Artykuł Pulaski Foundation: Strategy for the energy crisis communication pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/pulaski-foundation-strategy-for-the-energy-crisis-communication/feed/ 0
OSW: US Marines in northern Norway https://biznesalert.com/osw-us-marines-in-northern-norway/ https://biznesalert.com/osw-us-marines-in-northern-norway/#respond Tue, 10 Jul 2018 08:00:10 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2191 On 12 June, Norway’s ministers of defence and foreign affairs announced that the Norwegian government and parliament had granted approval for the rotational stationing of the US Marines to continue in Norway for the next five years and for an increase of the US contingent from 330 to 700 soldiers. Soldiers from the US Marine […]

Artykuł OSW: US Marines in northern Norway pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
On 12 June, Norway’s ministers of defence and foreign affairs announced that the Norwegian government and parliament had granted approval for the rotational stationing of the US Marines to continue in Norway for the next five years and for an increase of the US contingent from 330 to 700 soldiers. Soldiers from the US Marine Corps (USMC) have been stationed on a rotational basis in central Norway (Vaernes near Trondheim) participating in training and exercises across the country since January 2017. At present, the US-Norwegian deal envisages a rotational presence of the second US contingent in Setermoen in Troms county in northern Norway – writes Justyna Gotkowska, analyst at OSW.

Commentary

Norway treats the USA as a guarantor of its security and as a priority ally inside NATO. The components of Norwegian-US defence relations include: (1) intelligence co-operation in the High North, (2) armament co-operation (including the purchase of 52 F-35 aircraft and five Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft), (3) the storage of US military equipment in Norway, and (4) the use of Norwegian air bases by the US. The rotational presence of USMC forces in Norway has been an important element of co-operation since 2017.

The rotational contingent of the USMC was deployed in Norway in 2017 and will be increased in 2018 for a few reasons. The presence of US soldiers strengthens the deterrence policy in the Norwegian High North. Norway is concerned about the development of Russia’s military potential in the Arctic. Oslo fears, for example, that Norway’s northern regions might become involved in a military operation should there be a conflict between NATO and Russia, given the strategic significance of the Barents Sea area for the Northern Fleet’s submarines armed with ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Thus the US Marines take part above all in training and exercises in Arctic conditions. The additional rotational presence of US soldiers in Troms county in the north of the country highlights this dimension of the deterrence policy. The presence of the US forces in Norway is also essential in the context of the policy of deterrence in the Baltic Sea region. This proves that US forces may have access to the Baltic theatre of operation from the side of northern Scandinavia. The deployment (with the option of strengthening during conflict) of a US contingent in central Norway (where US military equipment is stored) also offers the possibility of a rapid shifting of US troops from Norway to Sweden in case of crisis or conflict in the Baltic Sea region. Such a scenario was demonstrated, for example, during the Swedish Aurora 17 defence exercises in September 2017 in which US forces (around 1,300 soldiers) participated for the first time.

The US forces are stationed in Norway not within NATO framework but under bilateral US-Norwegian agreements and they are an element of strengthening US forces in Europe as part of the European Deterrence Initiative. According to the Norwegian government, the legal base for the rotational presence of the USMC contingent is the bilateral memorandum of understanding signed in 2005 governing prestockage and reinforcement of Norway and establishing the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N). MCPP-N is based on the Cold War programme of ammunition and military equipment storage initiated in 1981, which in 2005 was once again adjusted to the needs of the US Marine Corps. According to information available, the stored military equipment is designated for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force; since 2014 it has been partly replenished and replaced. The stored ammunition is, in turn, expected to be sufficient to sustain a Marine Expeditionary Brigade in combat for 30 days. The equipment and ammunition are stored near Trondheim in six rock caves and two air bases. Norway pays half of the programme costs.

Source: OSW

Artykuł OSW: US Marines in northern Norway pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/osw-us-marines-in-northern-norway/feed/ 0
Polish Briefing: A team at the Ministry of Energy is to accelerate the Polish nuclear project https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-a-team-at-the-ministry-of-energy-is-to-accelerate-the-polish-nuclear-project/ https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-a-team-at-the-ministry-of-energy-is-to-accelerate-the-polish-nuclear-project/#respond Tue, 10 Jul 2018 07:00:30 +0000 http://biznesalert.com/?p=2189 What goes on in Poland on the 10th of July. A team at the Ministry of Energy is to accelerate the Polish nuclear project The Minister of Energy Krzysztof Tchórzewski, appointed a team for the development of changes in the special nuclear legislation to accelerate the investment process related to the construction of the first […]

Artykuł Polish Briefing: A team at the Ministry of Energy is to accelerate the Polish nuclear project pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
What goes on in Poland on the 10th of July.

A team at the Ministry of Energy is to accelerate the Polish nuclear project

The Minister of Energy Krzysztof Tchórzewski, appointed a team for the development of changes in the special nuclear legislation to accelerate the investment process related to the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Poland.

On July 6, 2018, in the Official Journal of the Ministry of Energy, the “Order of the Minister of Energy regarding the appointment of a team to prepare changes in the subject of preparation and implementation of investments in the field of nuclear power facilities and accompanying investments” was published. The order came into force on July 7, 2018.

The main task of the team is to develop a draft amendment to the Act of 29 June 2011 on the preparation and implementation of investments in the field of nuclear power facilities and accompanying investments. The team will act as an auxiliary body of the Minister of Energy. It will be composed of representatives of the Ministry of Energy and the National Atomic Energy Agency, as well as – as an advisory – representatives of the General Directorate for Environmental Protection and PGE EJ 1. The team is to submit proposals for amendments to the nuclear special provisions by December 31, 2018.

“We want to maximally shorten the entire investment process of the construction of a nuclear power plant in Poland. The team will perform a comprehensive analysis of the current special act in the broader context of its coherence with other regulations to improve the implementation of the Polish nuclear power program”- explains Józef Sobolewski, Director of the Nuclear Energy Department at the Ministry of Energy.

Pawlak: The NIK report on the gas contract is one-sided

After declassifying the report of the Supreme Audit Office on the backstage of gas contracts concluded in 2010, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak took the floor. The politician was charged with the highest responsibility for the signed contract, which according to some experts is unfavorable for Poland.

– I greet Minister Naimski and ask why such a classy warrior in the matter of gas purity, did not see to his colleagues from the PiS government in 2006 and allowed Gazprom to increase gas prices by 10%. This resulted in higher costs (by more than USD 1 billion) for Polish companies and households – Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Waldemar Pawlak wrote on one of the social networks.

In his opinion, the recently declassified NIK material is extremely one-sided, concerns a lot of irrelevant details, and completely negates the fundamental responsibility of PiS politicians – Treasury Minister Wojciech Jasiński, Deputy Minister of Economy Piotr Naimski and Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński.

In particular, it is about establishing the Gaz System operator on the Yamal pipeline (100% state-owned company) and the physical reverse on the Yamal, that is the physical possibility of importing gas from the West. This means that the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline is one, totally unjustified spending of PLN 7 billion – he wrote.

In addition, he pointed out that in 2011-2015 imports from the east systematically decreased, and in 2010-2015 the share of imports from other directions (mainly from the European Union) increased threefold.

Artykuł Polish Briefing: A team at the Ministry of Energy is to accelerate the Polish nuclear project pochodzi z serwisu BiznesAlert EN.

]]>
https://biznesalert.com/polish-briefing-a-team-at-the-ministry-of-energy-is-to-accelerate-the-polish-nuclear-project/feed/ 0