Inferring from the facts: If the revised Directive had posed any threat to Nord Stream 2, Germany would have been opposing it much stronger – writes Grzegorz Krzyżanowski, BiznesAlert.pl co-worker from The European University Institute.
Directive was agreed upon because it was largely deprived of its regulatory power, and back then (12 February) nothing really indicated the possible delay of the construction of Nord Stream 2. But when Denmark requested the assessment of the southern route for the pipeline (27 March) the delay has become a reality. Following on that decision the fierce campaign was initiated: threats of legal action against EC (12 April), pressure on Denmark (15 April), and threats to stop supplies to Ukraine by tying them with future transit agreement (27 April).
What it essential in identifying the main trigger of the latest wave of Nord Stream 2 AG’s activity (and its Russian and German advocates) is to track the whole process and see when the reactions started to flow. Thus, it’s clearly not caused by the very soft Directive, but by the decisiveness of Danish policy. It’s important to get the facts straight as to undertake relevant policy measures. Since it’s not possible for the European Commission to amend Directive, it should focus on supporting Denmark.