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Military measures are definitely not enough to protect critical infrastructure, although of course they play an important role in deterring incursions against a strong state – says Lieutenant-commander Rafał Miętkiewicz, PhD, from the Polish Naval Academy of the Heroes of Westerplatte and expert at the Ignacy Łukasiewicz Institute for Energy Policy.
The importance of the Baltic Sea in the context of the energy transition is growing. Currently, the strategically important Baltic Pipe runs under the water, which makes us independent of the supply of raw materials from Russia, and critical infrastructure facilities such as the LNG Terminal in Świnoujście and the Naftoport in Gdańsk are located on the Polish coast.
However, due to Russia’s actions, protecting these facilities in the coming years will play a key role. The explosion of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines clearly shows how important it is to protect such infrastructure.
BiznesAlert.pl: What risks does critical infrastructure face at sea?
Rafał Miętkiewicz: These threats take different forms from cyber threats to potential acts of sabotage, terrorism using both sophisticated methods and the latest available technical means, as well as improvised means, which are no less dangerous. Soon we will start construction of offshore wind farms in the exclusive economic zone, expand ports and build a nuclear power plant on the coast.
In my opinion, it is possible to implement certain measures aimed at causing delays in construction. I do not want to point out any scenarios for such actions at this point. I would also draw attention to the possibility of using interest groups, activists or even local communities.
Although we are all aware, for example, of the need for energy transition and the development of renewable energy sources at sea, disinformation in this area can be carried out. In the West, there are occasional protests against offshore wind energy, but they are present in public discussion.
I draw attention to the need to ensure an adequate level of protection of infrastructure at the stage of its construction, regardless of whether the work is carried out where the sea meets the shore or in the high seas.
Another important aspect is making sure the companies involved are protected against threats that may be carried out by their own employees. However, this is done by the relevant services (special services). They have at their disposal advanced means and measures they can use to identify threats caused by intentional human actions, which the National Protection Program for Critical Infrastructure includes.
How do we protect critical infrastructure facilities on the Polish coast? Will military means suffice?
Military measures are definitely not enough to protect critical infrastructure, although of course they play an important role in deterring incursions against a strong state. When the problem of protecting critical infrastructure on the coast is viewed holistically, it turns out that it is necessary to coordinate the actions of many services that acquire information on planned attacks and other acts directed against critical infrastructure, and to monitor the situation in all domains.
An effective way to protect oneself is to avoid direct threats. Prevention requires active action and the use of potential at sea, in the air and in the sea or at the bottom. Cyber security should not be forgotten. Renewable energy sources controlled by IT systems require adequate security and personnel with a high level of risk awareness.
In accordance with the National Protection Program for Critical Infrastructure, in order to ensure safety, measures are taken to minimize the risk of disruption of critical infrastructure facilities by reducing the likelihood of a threat, reducing vulnerability and minimizing the effects of the threat.
Poland also intends to develop offshore wind farms, but they can become an easy target for Russia’s sabotage. How can we protect offshore farms?
In the case of offshore wind, there are a lot of questions to be answered about the potential risks and how they can be minimized to an acceptable level. Another issue concerns the vulnerability of such facilities to attacks and other activities, and therefore the identification of weaknesses in the system. In order to minimize the impact, mechanisms should be developed to allow for the replacement of capacity suspended in result of hazards until it is restored.
I see the issue of protecting offshore wind farms as an extremely complex one. Firstly, these will be objects, at least in the current legal state, located outside the territorial sea, and therefore more than 20 km from the coastline. Secondly the area of the 1st and 2nd phase of the investment process encompasses over 2,300 km2 (it’s close to the Słupsk poviat – the biggest poviat in Poland and many times bigger than the area of Poland’s largest cities including Warsaw which has about 517 square kilometers , or Kraków – about 327 square kilometers).
Offshore wind farms are connected to a complete transmission infrastructure which includes offshore transformer stations, underwater cables and facilities used for power evacuation to the National Power System. In terms of the entire industry, it is hundreds or even thousands of kilometers of cables.
The offshore farms will be located near busy shipping lanes, and two distinctive investment lanes are separated by the Słupsk trench whose bathymetry is suitable for submarine and diversionary activities in the lower half-zone.
Whether offshore wind farms will be an easy target for sabotage depends on their level of security and their determination to continually improve protection. This requires incurring certain costs and maintaining a high level of awareness among management bodies of companies about the specific safety situation in the Baltic waters. It is also necessary to have a complete picture of the situation from many sources and sensors distributed spatially but also competently (resources under the jurisdiction of different ministries or NATO).
The Polish Defense Ministry warns that it will fire at vessels that approach Polish critical infrastructure. Will this level of protection be sufficient?
Article 27 of the draft law amending the law on the protection of shipping and seaports speaks of the prevention, restriction or removal of immediate danger against objects located in the exclusive economic zone resulting from the action of foreign warships or foreign military floating objects.
Thus, we are talking about threats of a military nature both on the surface of the sea and under water. It is essential for commanders responsible for taking appropriate action to know what constitutes an immediate danger, e.g. to an oil rig or an offshore transformer station.
Will infringing on the security zone, e.g. 500 or 1,000 meters around a specific facility, be considered immediate danger? Let us remember that warships of foreign countries, as part of the exercise of freedom of navigation can navigate in the waters of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Poland. This is guaranteed by the international law of the sea. The activities of the Navy, for which the waters of the exclusive economic zone constitute the area of the Maritime Defense Zone, in the current situation are carried out in a state of peace, crisis and war.
I would classify actions aimed at repelling an immediate threat at least at a crisis-level event, if not a war. Thus, taking into account the above and the nature of the Baltic security environment, it is necessary to ask the question of the legitimacy of the formulation of tasks depending on the mentioned situations. It is difficult to adequately respond to the actions of a party carrying out aggressive, confrontational actions, although still within the limits of the law, in the field of activities involving peaceful functioning. The intentions of the other side are quite clear.
I am not talking about generateing direct threats to other states, but only indicating to the potentially hostile side clear limits on the level of tolerance of certain behaviors by the state located on the eastern flank of NATO. Times are critical and it seems reasonable to act appropriately to the level of tension with the full involvement of allies.
Interview by Jacek Perzyński
