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SECURITY 4 April, 2022 2:30 pm   
COMMENTS: Mateusz Gibała

Kamizela: Swordfish frigates are slowly emerging from the shadows (INTERVIEW)

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“The news about the Swordfish frigates was revealing to a degree, but also sparked new questions and doubts. We still have to wait for more information,” says Dawid Kamizela, a military expert at the Nowa Technika Wojskowa monthly (New Military Technology – ed.) in an interview with BiznesAlert.pl.

BiznesAlert.pl: We already have some information on what the Swordfish frigates will look. We know a few details about the installed weapons and equipment. What does this tell us about the direction in which the modernization of the Navy will go?

David Kamizela: Yes, we do have some information about the weapons systems and configuration of the ships. On the basis of statements from the spokesperson of the Armament Agency it is clear that a certain compromise has been reached when it comes to the role of these vessels within the Navy. So far, the discussions on the their role revolved around air defense aspects. We didn’t really know whether and what capabilities these ships would have when it comes to anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Now it has been confirmed that in addition to the underwater sonar, which is an absolute minimum, these ships will also be equipped with a towed array sonar, which greatly increases a vessel’s ability to search and destroy enemy submarines with MU90 torpedoes. This system is both active, which means it sends on its own signals to locate submarines, and passive, which allows it to “listen” for sounds underwater without being detected. It wasn’t obvious that this system would be there, so it’s kind of a positive surprise. The ship’s engine room will probably be based on a diesel engine with a reduction gear. This is not an optimal solution for ASW missions, but it is not as crucial for the role these ships will need to perform.

Paradoxically, we still don’t know much about the ships’ air defence system. On the one hand, we actually know that it will be armed with British-made CAMM missiles, and we also know that it will be equipped with Mk 41 launchers. The vessels’ direct defiance system will be a Polish OSU-35M cannon. On the other hand, we do not know what will be the key air defense system of the ship, namely the radar system. In fact, that’s what determines what anti-aircraft weapons will be on board the new Polish frigates. The radar is important for two reasons. First, it determines what type of armor will be mounted on the vessel. In this context the range of the radar is key. If we decide that CAMM-ER missiles, with a maximum range of 60 km, will be the only anti-aircraft defence system on the frigates, then the radar’s range will have to exceed by a third, or even by half the missile range. It’s about making the best use of this system. The ship must see the target quickly enough to be able to properly use its defense systems.

Without a proper radar, it will not be possible to use all the capabilities of this system. This also raises the question of the actual use of missiles. CAMM-ER is an active guidance system, that is, in short, the missile has its own warhead, which guides the missile. In order to attack, it needs preliminary data on the target itself, but the ship’s radar does not need to “support” a missile that is already in the air. The situation is different in the case of SM-2 missiles, which require a dedicated radar. In addition to the bigger range, the radar must have an information exchange system between the radar and the so-called uplink and downlink missile. This exchange must take place in the appropriate radar bands, i.e. S or X. Such radars can actually only be fixed panel radars. This is probably why we the final configuration of the radars and the full armament of the air defence system have not been revealed, as one would disclose the other.

What about the anti-ship missiles? We know that our Swordfish frigates will be equipped with Swedish RBS missiles. Why did we choose these missiles instead of the newer and more promising Norwegian NSMs, which the Naval Missile Unit (NMU), among others, already owns?

The reason is simple – savings. Three 660M Orkan vessels are already equipped with RBS missiles, version MK3. In my opinion, the only reason why RBS has been chosen is that these missiles will be transferred from the decommissioned Orkans to the new frigates. This will cost a lot less than purchasing new NSMs. Another option, less likely, but possible, was chossing NSM without buying NSM. In other words – transferring some missiles from the Naval Missile Unit to the frigates, but that would mean the NMU would lose some of its potential, and RBS would be left unused. We would not be able to mount that system on Jelcz trucks. I’m not criticizing this entire idea. If we have a limited budget and we have to save on something, then this seems perfectly logical.

The RBS MK3 came aboard the Orkans in 2015. All three Swordfish frigates are scheduled to enter service by 2033. This means that at the very beginning these ships will have missiles that have already had at least 15 years of service. Not to mention the fact that these rockets will no longer be a technological miracle.

There are two issues. The first is the overall efficiency of these missiles, that is, their service life. It is certain that before being installed on the frigates, the missiles will go to the manufacturer for a series of tests and the possible extension of the service life. After such an inspection, these missiles will be fully operational and safe to use. This can be solved at a relatively low cost. The second problem is that these missiles will become technologically obsolete. Undoubtedly they will no longer be able to respond to the challenges of the 2030s. However, here, anti-ship missiles are not, paradoxically, the most important concern. We have the NMU, and as for the ships, no one forbids us to use RBS’s on frigates for 10-20 years, and then replace them with, for example, NSMs. This is neither a technical problem nor a modification challenge. I would not be surprised if the first ship was armed with RBSs, and the next ones with NSMs. It’s not out of the question. That’s what happened, among others, in the case of the Israeli ships Saar, which at one time carried on board both American Harpoons and Israel’s Gabriels. This configuration made sense.

According to the original plans, the three frigates were to cost about eight billion zlotys. That was before the inflation, steel prices and other materials soared. The question is whether this amount is enough to meet the expectations that have been presented in terms of weapons and equipment?

Nobody knows that. Here again I will return to the question of choosing the radar, which is a large part of the cost of building a ship. To show this scale, let me refer to the example of the Spanish frigates. It was decided to equip them with five SPY-7 radars from Lockheed Martin, that is, radars used, among others, in the AEGIS system, which is a typical anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system, which is absolutely from the top shelf. This purchase cost the Spaniards USD 500 million. We need three radars, which means we’ll pay a little less, but disproportionately. This will cost at least a billion zlotys, that is, it will account for 10 to 20 percent of the cost of the entire ship. And we are talking here only about the radar, without fire-control radars, combat systems, weapons, electronic warfare systems, ASW, etc. So we have to wait for the final configuration of the ships. Then we will be aware and confident about whether we have enough resources.

I have to ask about the impact of the conflict in Ukraine on how the Swordfish frigates should be configured. Of course, this is not a maritime conflict in principle, but it may give us some general picture of what is happening and what could potentially await us. 

From the point of view of the Ukrainian navy, this conflict says nothing. At the outbreak of the war, the Ukrainian navy was in an even worse state than its Polish counterpart. The ships were obsolete, not modernized. In fact, the only modern units were small patrol boats, which did not matter for the course of the war. The war reveals how Russian troops work, especially the air force. In any war, the key factor is the so-called kill chain – find, fix, track, target, engage, assess impact, etc. This is a chain that cannot be broken. It is not the case that the missile will hit the right target and actually destroy it. The launch of the missile itself is only the sixth of the seven points. This situation makes reconnaissance and situational awareness crucial. A war on the Baltic Sea would not mean everything at sea would be a target, as even Russians don’t have this kind of potential. To select a valuable target and destroy it, you need to go through the whole process. Removing one of these “steps” creates a problem, and the war in Ukraine has revealed that Russia has difficulties with literally every one of these elements. The conflict has exposed the problems of the Russian army. These problems also affect the Russian navy.
Therefore, we cannot evaluate the Russian army as a force that has the potential to fight on an equal footing with NATO as an alliance, because it is not able to cope with an opponent with a much lower military potential, which, from our perspective, is a positive conclusion from the war in Ukraine.

Interview by Mariusz Marszałkowski